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from	  the	   terms	  of	  most	  software	   licensing.	   	  So	   I	   think	   it’s	   safe	   to	  say	   that	   most	   people	   don’t	   own	   their	   software.	  .	  .	  .	   The	   other	  ramification,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  a	  similar	  license	  could	  not	  be	  put	  into	  the	  cover	  of	  a	  book.	  	  It	  wouldn’t	  be	  difficult	  for	  everybody	  to	  implement	  this.1	   Greg	  Beck,	  defense	  attorney	  in	  Vernor	  v.	  Autodesk	  INTRODUCTION	  Imagine	  for	  a	  moment	  that	  you	  are	  in	  the	  market	  for	  a	  new	  car.	   	  You	  find	   a	   sports	   car	   that	   you	   like,	   talk	   with	   a	   salesperson	   and	   ultimately	  purchase	  a	  new	  automobile.	  	  This	  car	  is	  effectively	  the	  same	  as	  thousands	  of	  other	  cars.	   	   It	   is	  a	  copy.	   	  You	  were	  not	  under	  the	  impression	  that	  you	  were	  buying	  the	  rights	  to	  the	  design	  of	  the	  car	  or	  to	  reproduce	  the	  car	  to	  the	  exact	  specifications	  as	  your	  own	  copy.	  	  However,	  you	  believe	  that	  you	  can	  do	  with	  this	  car	  what	  you	  will.	   	  You	  can	  put	  bigger	  wheels	  on	  it,	  put	  stickers	  on	   it,	  modify	   the	  engine,	  or	  paint	   it	   a	  new	  shade	  of	  green.	   	  You	  can	  sell	  the	  car.	  	  You	  can	  give	  it	  away.	  	  You	  have	  consumer	  freedom,	  based	  on	   a	   court-­‐created	   and	   legislature-­‐supported	   doctrine	   known	   as	   “first	  sale.”2	  Now,	   what	   would	   happen	   if	   the	   car	  manufacturer	   decided	   that	   you	  should	  not	  own	  a	  copy,	  but	  rather	  you	  should	  merely	  have	  a	  license	  to	  the	  car?	   	   After	   all,	   such	   agreements	   favor	   the	   automaker,	   allowing	   greater	  control	  over	  consumer	  use	  of	   their	  product	  after	   it	  has	  been	  purchased.	  	  Now,	  when	  you	  open	   the	  door	   to	   step	   into	   the	   car	   for	   the	   first	   time,	   an	  attorney	  is	  sitting	  in	  the	  passenger	  seat.	  	  This	  attorney,	  holding	  a	  package	  of	  papers	  by	  his	  side,	   tells	  you	  that	  all	  you	  have	  to	  do	   is	   turn	  on	  the	  car	  and	  he	  can	  be	  on	  his	  way.	  	  If	  you	  so	  desire,	  you	  can	  read	  his	  papers,	  which	  contain	  more	  terms	  that	  you	  must	  agree	  to	  now	  that	  you	  have	  bought	  the	  car.	   	   If	   you	  do	  not	  want	   to	   agree	   to	   these	  new	   terms,	   you	   can	   step	  out,	  return	   the	   car	   and	   go	   home.	   	   In	   this	   hypothetical	   transaction,	   all	  automobile	   sales	   are	   now	   really	   leases,	   as	   the	   car	   manufacturers	   have	  collectively	   stopped	   offering	   cars	   for	   sale.	   	   This	   car	   is	   actually	   being	  licensed	  to	  you.	  	  You	  will	  agree	  to	  this	  license	  by	  starting	  the	  car.	  In	   your	   desire	   to	   expedite	   the	   process,	   you	   decide	   to	   just	   turn	   the	  keys.	  	  The	  engine	  fires	  up	  and	  the	  attorney	  leaves,	  papers	  in	  hand.	  	  When	  driving	  back	  from	  the	  dealership,	  however,	  the	  car	  begins	  to	  act	  up.	  	  You	  try	  to	  turn	  off	  the	  highway	  onto	  the	  exit	  to	  your	  home,	  but	  the	  car	  will	  not	  
 1. 	  	  David	  Kravets,	  Guess	  What,	  You	  Don't	  Own	  the	  Software	  You	  Bought,	  WIRED	  (Sept.	  10,	  2010,	  2:01	  PM),	  http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/09/first-­‐sale-­‐doctrine.	  2. 	  	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  109(a)	  (2006).	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turn.	  	  There	  is	  a	  device	  in	  the	  car	  that	  prevents	  you	  from	  taking	  the	  exit;	  that	  action	  violates	  the	  agreement	  you	  made	  with	  the	  manufacturer	  when	  you	   started	   the	   car.	   	   You	   search	   around	   the	   dashboard,	   find	   the	   device	  and	   remove	   it.	   	   This	   is	   against	   the	   agreement	   as	  well.	   	   You	   are	  notified	  that	   you	   are	   breaking	   the	   law	   and	   are	   now	   in	   violation	   of	   your	   lease	  agreement.	   	  Unfamiliar	  with	  such	   things,	  you	  decide	   that	   this	   car	   is	   just	  not	   for	   you.	   	   You	   try	   to	   re-­‐sell	   the	   car,	   as	   you	   can	   no	   longer	   return	   it.	  	  Again,	   you	  are	  notified	  you	  are	  breaking	   the	   law	  and	   the	   contract.	   	   You	  are	  not	  even	  permitted	  to	  give	  the	  car	  away.	  	  You	  are	  left	  with	  a	  perfectly	  useful	   car	   that	   you	   cannot	  use	   and	   cannot	   get	   rid	   of.	   	   The	   car	  has	  been	  legally	  handicapped	  by	  the	  manufacturer	  even	  though	  it	  is	  physically	  and	  perfectly	   functional.	   	   Your	   consumer	   freedom	   has	   been	   limited	   by	   the	  simple	   inclusion	  of	   a	   few	   terms	   in	  your	  agreement.	   	  A	  useful	  product	   is	  rendered	  useless.	  The	   above	   hypothetical,	   although	   somewhat	   unbelievable	   when	  applied	  to	  the	  new	  car	  market,	  demonstrates	  an	  emerging	  and	  potentially	  problematic	   reality	   in	   the	   world	   of	   intellectual	   property	   rights:	   the	  growing	   use	   of	   contract	   law,	   specifically	   end	   user	   licensing	   agreements	  (EULAs),	   to	   usurp	   important	   rights	   legally	   endowed	   on	   both	   retail	   and	  consumer	   software	   purchasers.	   	   For	  more	   than	   one	   hundred	   years,	   the	  first	   sale	  doctrine	  has	  protected	  purchasers	  of	   books,	  movies	   and	  other	  intellectual	   property	   from	   extensive	   use	   restrictions	   pursued	   by	  copyright	   owners	   after	   a	   copy	   is	   first	   sold.3	   	   However,	   the	   increasingly	  large	  role	  of	  digital	  intellectual	  property	  in	  the	  average	  consumer’s	  media	  access,	   combined	   with	   Congress’s	   current	   deference	   to	   court-­‐created	  copyright	  law,	  has	  led	  to	  a	  deviation	  in	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  protection	  and	  a	  weakening	  of	  individual	  rights	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  software	  sales.	  Demonstrated	  by	   the	  Ninth	  Circuit	   decision	   in	  Vernor	   v.	   Autodesk,	   it	  appears	  that,	  through	  licensing	  agreements,	  first	  sale	  no	  longer	  applies	  to	  computer	  software	  users.4	  	  This	  business	  practice,	  while	  common	  among	  software	   copyright	   owners,	   threatens	   to	   spill	   over	   into	   other	   major	  copyright-­‐based	   industries	   including	   music	   and	   movies;	   such	   support	  over	  time	  could	  very	  well	  lead	  to	  the	  end	  of	  digital	  ownership	  altogether.	  	  However,	   all	   is	   certainly	   not	   lost.	   	   As	   the	   Vernor	   court	   has	   stated,	  “Congress	   is	   free,	   of	   course,	   to	   modify	   the	   first	   sale	   doctrine	   and	   the	  essential	  step	  defense	  if	  it	  deems	  these	  or	  other	  policy	  considerations	  to	  require	  a	  different	  approach.”5	  	  Also,	  the	  Ninth	  Circuit	  has	  now	  reigned	  in	  
 3. 	  	  See	  Bobbs-­‐Merrill	  Co.	  v.	  Straus,	  210	  U.S.	  339	  (1908).	  4. 	  	  Vernor	  v.	  Autodesk,	  Inc.,	  621	  F.3d	  1102,	  1115	  (9th	  Cir.	  2010),	  cert.	  denied,	  132	  S.	  Ct.	  105	  (U.S.	  2011).	  5. 	  	  Id.	  at	  1115.	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the	  rather	  low	  Vernor	  licensing	  threshold,	  in	  terms	  of	  copyrighted	  music,	  through	   the	   post-­‐Vernor	   decision	   UMG	   Recordings,	   Inc.	   v.	   Augusto.6	  	  However,	   the	   time	   is	   ripe	   for	   the	   courts	   and	   Congress	   to	   clear	   up	   the	  currently	  murky	   legal	   waters	   stirred	   by	   the	   conflicting	   ideals	   of	   digital	  licensing	  and	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine.	  	  The	  low	  software	  licensing	  threshold	  promulgated	  by	  the	  Vernor	  decision	  has	  demonstrated	  a	  movement	  away	  from	  the	  original	  end	  of	  copyright	  law,	  protection	  of	  the	  development	  of	  public	   knowledge,	   towards	   a	   more	   owner-­‐centric	   value	   system.7	   	   The	  more	   courts	   interpret	   the	   currently	   unclear,	   seemingly	   conflicting	  doctrines,	  the	  more	  confused	  the	  law	  will	  become.	  Ultimately,	   I	  will	  propose	   two	  methods	  of	   solving	   this	   lack	  of	   clarity	  through	   legislation.	   	   First,	   the	   courts	   could	   simply	   do	   nothing	   and	   see	  how	   legal	   jurisprudence,	   including	   a	   likely	   future	   Supreme	   Court	  decision,	  will	   decide	   how	   to	   deal	  with	   this	   intersection	   of	   contract	   and	  copyright	  law.	   	  Second,	  I	  will	  propose	  that	  the	  courts	  defend	  consumers’	  abilities	   to	  do	  with	   their	  purchased	   intellectual	  property	  what	   they	  will	  by	   establishing	   and	   consequently	   strengthening	   the	   judicially-­‐created	  defense	  of	  copyright	  misuse.	  I.	  	  A	  BRIEF	  HISTORY	  OF	  COPYRIGHT	  LIMITATION:	  FIRST	  SALE	  
A.	  	  The	  Grounds	  and	  Goals	  of	  Modern	  Copyright	  Law	  In	  order	   to	  understand	   the	   impact	  of	   recent	  Ninth	  Circuit	   rulings	  on	  copyright	  law,	  I	  will	  first	  give	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  system’s	  beginnings.	  	  The	   initial	   call	   for	   Congress	   to	   implement	   a	   copyright	   system	   into	  American	  law	  came	  from	  the	  United	  States	  Constitution,	  Article	  I,	  Section	  8,	   Clause	   8.	   	   This	   provision,	   now	   commonly	   known	   as	   the	   Copyright	  Clause,	  endowed	  Congress	  the	  power	  to	  “promote	  the	  Progress	  of	  Science	  and	  useful	  Arts,	  by	  securing	   for	   limited	  Times	   to	  Authors	  and	   Inventors	  the	  exclusive	  Right	  to	  their	  respective	  Writings	  and	  Discoveries.”8	   	  Since	  the	   adoption	   of	   the	   Constitution,	   Congress	   has	   ultimately	   established	  laws	  governing	  copyright	  use	  in	  Title	  17	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Code.	   	  Last	  revised	   in	   the	   Copyright	   Act	   of	   1976,	   this	   Title	   abolished	   most	   state	  copyright	   law	  under	  a	  preemption	  provision	  given	  in	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  301(a).	  	  Simply	  put,	  we	  now	  have	  a	  uniform	  federal	  system	  governing	  copyrights.	  The	   final	   goal	   of	   our	   federal	   copyright	   law	   has	   consequently	   been	  
 6. 	  	  See	  UMG	  Recordings,	  Inc.	  v.	  Augusto,	  628	  F.3d	  1175	  (9th	  Cir.	  2011).	  	  7. 	  	  Feist	   Publ'ns,	   Inc.	   v.	   Rural	   Tel.	   Serv.	   Co.,	   499	   U.S.	   340,	   349	   (1991).	   (quoting	   U.S.	  CONST.	   art.	   I,	   §	  8,	   cl.	   8.)	   (“The	   primary	   objective	   of	   copyright	   is	   not	   to	   reward	   the	   labor	   of	  authors,	  but	  ‘[t]o	  promote	  the	  Progress	  of	  Science	  and	  useful	  Arts.'").	  	  8. 	  	  U.S.	  CONST.	  art.	  I,	  §	  8,	  cl.	  8.	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endowed	  with	  a	  twofold	  purpose.	  	  First,	  copyrights	  incentivize	  creativity	  by	   giving	   limited,	   exclusive	   rights	   to	   copyright-­‐owning	   creators.	   	   These	  property	  rights	  are	   limited	   in	  time	  and	  apply	  only	  to	  expressions	  rather	  than	  ideas.9	  	  Also,	  there	  exist	  further	  exceptions	  to	  the	  copyright	  owner’s	  rights,	  which	  strike	  a	  balance	  between	  owners’	  rights	  and	  consumer	  use.	  The	   second	   purpose	   of	   copyright	   law	   is	   to	   promote	   and	   ultimately	  endow	   the	   public	   with	   the	   greatest	   amount	   of	   knowledge,	   cultivated	  through	   the	   encouragement	   of	   creativity.	   	   Thus,	   the	   duration	   limitation	  placed	  on	  copyrights	  serves	  to	  eventually	  disseminate	  all	  creativity	  from	  the	   original	   creator	   to	   the	   public	   domain,	   which	   benefits	   society	   as	   a	  whole	  through	  increasing	  our	  collective	  wealth	  of	  knowledge.	  Although	   the	   stated	   purposes	   of	   United	   States	   copyright	   law	  theoretically	  strike	  a	  balance	  between	  rewarding	  creators	  and	  increasing	  the	   public	   domain	   of	   knowledge	   for	   the	   good	   of	   all,	   the	   reality	   is	   that	  these	  two	  ideals	  are	  in	  great	  conflict.	  	  As	  a	  piece	  of	  intellectual	  rather	  than	  physical	   property,	   a	   creator’s	   expression	   is	   intangible	   in	   its	   existence.	  	  Tangible	   property’s	   value	   resides	   in	   its	   physical	   exclusivity;	   only	   one	  individual	  is	  capable	  of	  owning	  one	  specific	  physical	  object	  at	  a	  time.	  	  One	  piece	  of	   land	  has	  value	  because	  only	  one	  person	  can	  own	   it	   exclusively.	  	  However,	   intangible	   intellectual	   property,	   such	   as	   a	   story,	   can	  theoretically	   be	   copied	   over	   and	   over	   again	   without	   any	   loss	   or	  degradation	   to	   the	   initial	   work.	   	   Many	   people	   can	   access	   the	   work	  without	  excluding	  anyone	  else.	   	   Intellectual	  property,	  then,	   is	   like	  a	  well	  that	  cannot	  run	  dry.	  	  Copyrights	  serve	  to	  add	  value	  to	  creativity	  by	  giving	  authors	   the	   right	   to	   exclude	   others	   from	   using	   or	   accessing	   a	   work	  without	   the	   author’s	   permission.10	   	   Through	   this	   right	   to	   exclude,	  copyright	   owners	   are	   free	   to	   sell	   and	   give	   away	   their	   works	   as	   they	  please	  for	  their	  own	  benefit	  for	  a	  limited	  duration	  of	  time.	  A	  copyright	  owner,	  then,	  wants	  to	  maintain	  control	  over	  his	  work	  for	  as	   long	   as	   possible	   in	   order	   to	   maximize	   the	   benefits	   provided	   by	  exclusive	   copyrights.	   	   The	   expressed	   ideas	   created	   as	   an	   effect	   of	   such	  exclusive	  rights	  are	  meant	  to	  benefit	  the	  nation	  as	  a	  whole	  by	  promoting	  public	   dissemination	   of	   creative	   works.11	   	   However,	   it	   is	   definitionally	  impossible	   for	   such	   dissemination	   to	   occur	   as	   long	   as	   an	   author	  maintains	   his	   right	   to	   exclude	   others	   from	   accessing	   his	   work.	   	   This	  conflict	   represents	  a	   real	  problem	   in	   the	  copyright	  system,	  one	   that	  has	  not	   and	   may	   never	   be	   completely	   remedied.	   	   In	   addition,	   due	   to	   a	  copyright	   owner’s	   natural	   inclination	   to	   restrict	   the	   rights	   of	   others	   to	  
 9. 	  	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  102(a)	  (2006).	  10. 	  See	  17	  U.S.C.	  §§	  107–22	  (2006).	  11. 	  See	  Feist	  Publ'ns,	  Inc.,	  499	  U.S.	  at	  350.	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use	   his	   work	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   maximize	   its	   value,	   there	   exists	   a	   lot	   of	  pressure	  on	  lawmakers	  to	  expand	  these	  rights	  to	  exclude	  in	  both	  capacity	  and	  duration.	  	  However,	  these	  issues	  will	  be	  confronted	  in	  detail	  later.	  	  At	  this	   point,	   I	   will	   first	   expand	   on	   the	   area	   of	   copyright	   law	   that	   is	   the	  subject	  of	   this	   comment,	   the	   first	   sale	  doctrine,	   in	  order	   to	  describe	   the	  very	   real	   struggle	   of	   exclusion	   against	   dissemination	   as	   it	   has	   evolved.	  	  For	  our	  purposes	  then,	  we	  will	  focus	  on	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  109,	  in	  which	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  is	  codified.	  
B.	  	  The	  Evolution	  of	  First	  Sale	  Initially,	  it	  is	  vital	  to	  understand	  that	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine,	  like	  much	  of	   copyright	   law,	   actually	   originates	   from	   judicial	   construction,	   dating	  back	  to	  the	  United	  States	  Supreme	  Court	  case	  Bobbs-­‐Merrill	  Co.	  v.	  Straus.12	  	  Decided	  in	  1908,	  almost	  seventy	  years	  before	  the	  doctrine’s	  most	  recent	  codification,	  this	  case	  laid	  the	  groundwork	  for	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  and	  established	  a	   limitation	  on	  the	  control	   that	  an	  author	  has	  over	  copies	  of	  his	  work.	  	  In	  Bobbs-­‐Merril,	  a	  publisher	  attempted	  to	  maintain	  the	  value	  of	  his	   book	   by	   including	   language	   restricting	   the	   resale	   price	   of	   the	  work	  after	  a	  consumer	  had	  purchased	  a	  copy:	  “The	  price	  of	  this	  book	  at	  retail	  is	  one	  dollar	  net.	  	  No	  dealer	  is	  licensed	  to	  sell	  it	  at	  a	  less	  price,	  and	  a	  sale	  at	  a	  less	   price	   will	   be	   treated	   as	   an	   infringement	   of	   the	   copyright.”13	   	   The	  plaintiff	   argued	   that	   this	   phrase,	   located	   inside	   the	   cover	   of	   every	  book	  printed	   and	   sold,	   constituted	   a	   binding	   license	   on	   purchasers	   and	  prevented	   consumer	   and	   sellers	   from	   reducing	   the	   given	   price	   in	   any	  instant	   sale	   or	   resale.14	   	   Disagreeing	   with	   the	   given	   argument,	   the	  Supreme	  Court	   held	   that	   copyright	   law	  did	  not	   create	   the	   right	   to	   limit	  upon	  notice	  a	  copy	  owner’s	  ability	  to	  resell	  the	  book	  as	  he	  pleases.15	  	  The	  copyright	   owner’s	   legally	   granted	   right	   to	   vend,	   the	   Court	   said,	   was	  exercised	   and	   then	   extinguished	   upon	   the	   first	   sale	   of	   a	   copy.16	   	   The	  retailer	   who	   purchased	   the	   copy,	   and	   the	   subsequent	   consumers	   who	  picked	   up	   the	   book	   for	   eleven	   cents	   less	   than	   the	   copyright	   owner	  desired,	  were	  both	  free	  to	  sell	  their	  copies	  as	  they	  will.	  	  Shortly	  after	  this	  ruling,	  Congress	  adopted	  its	  first	  iteration	  of	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  in	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  of	  1909.17	  Since	   the	  doctrine’s	   onset,	   the	   right	   of	   a	   copyright	   owner	   to	   restrict	  
 12. 	  Bobbs-­‐Merrill	  Co.	  v.	  Straus,	  210	  U.S.	  339	  (1908).	  	  13. 	  Id.	  at	  341.	  14. 	  Id.	  at	  342–43.	  15. 	  Id.	  at	  350–51.	  16. 	  Id.	  at	  351.	  17. 	  Copyright	  Act	  of	  1909,	  ch.	  320,	  §	  41,	  35	  Stat.	  1075,	  1084	  (1909).	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the	  sale	  of	  copies	  of	  his	  work	  has	  been	  statutorily	  restricted	  to	  the	  initial	  first	  sale.18	  	  This	  policy	  permitted	  the	  development	  of	  the	  used	  market	  for	  copyrighted	  works	   to	   continue	   and	   supported	   consumers’	   ability	   to	   do	  what	  they	  will	  with	  legally	  purchased	  copies.	  	  Subsequently,	  the	  1976	  Act	  brought	  some	  notable	  clarifications	   to	   the	   first	  sale	  doctrine,	  codified	   in	  Section	  109.19	  	  First	  of	  all,	  the	  Section	  allows	  any	  owner	  of	  a	  copy,	  rather	  than	  only	  purchasers,	   “to	   sell	   or	  otherwise	  dispose	  of	   the	  possession	  of	  that	   copy”	   without	   the	   permission	   of	   the	   original	   copyright	   owner.20	  	  More	   restrictively,	   however,	   the	   statute	   excludes	   from	   the	   first	   sale	  exception	  those	  in	  possession	  of	  copies	  that	  have	  been	  rented	  or	  loaned,	  rather	   than	  purchased.21	   	  Therefore,	   the	   first	  sale	  exception	   to	  claims	  of	  copyright	   infringement	   applies	   when	   a	   court	   determines	   that	   the	  individual	   legally	   owns	   a	   copy	   of	   the	   work	   in	   dispute.	   	   Without	  ownership,	   an	   individual	  will	   not	   be	   able	   to	   benefit	   from	   the	   consumer	  protections	  of	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine.22	  Furthermore,	  an	  individual	  wishing	  to	  claim	  first	  sale	  protection	  also	  must	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  item	  he	  owns	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  copy.	  	  The	  Act	  defines	  a	   copy	  broadly:	   “‘Copies’	   are	  material	  objects,	  other	   than	  phonorecords,	  in	  which	  a	  work	   is	   fixed	  by	  any	  method	  now	  known	  or	   later	  developed,	  and	   from	   which	   the	   work	   can	   be	   perceived,	   reproduced,	   or	   otherwise	  communicated,	  either	  directly	  or	  with	   the	  aid	  of	  a	  machine	  or	  device.”23	  	  Moreover,	   the	   term	   “copies”	   includes	   the	   material	   object,	   other	   than	   a	  phonorecord,	   in	   which	   the	   work	   is	   first	   fixed.24	   	   In	   the	   physical	   realm	  then,	  it	  is	  relatively	  easy	  to	  distinguish	  between	  what	  is	  and	  is	  not	  a	  copy.	  	  A	  music	  CD,	  for	  instance,	  is	  a	  copy;	  it	  is	  physically	  fixed	  in	  a	  disk	  that	  can	  be	  perceived	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  a	  CD	  player	  and	  speakers.	  	  One	  can	  purchase	  such	   a	   music	   CD	   legally	   through	   retailers,	   and	   thus	   gain	   rightful	  ownership	   of	   a	   copy.	   	   Therefore,	   before	   the	   rapid	   expansion	   of	   the	  Internet	  and	  the	  boom	  of	  digital	  media	  and	  software,	  copy	  ownership	  was	  not	  an	  issue	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  consumers,	  as	  copies	  were	  the	  only	  way	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  works.	  
 18. 	  Id.,	  see	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  109(a).	  19. 	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  109.	  20. 	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  109(a).	  21. 	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  109(d).	  22. 	  Also	  note	  that	  more	  specifically,	  under	  Section	  117	  of	  the	  1976	  Act,	  the	  owner	  of	  a	  copy	  of	  software	  is	  allowed	  to	  make	  backup	  copies	  of	  the	  software	  for	  archival	  purposes,	  or	  as	  an	  essential	   step	   in	  using	   the	   software.	   	  Also,	   the	   law	  states	   that	   copies	   can	  be	  made	   for	   the	  maintenance	   or	   repair	   of	   an	   owned	   or	   licensed	   computer,	   as	   long	   as	   the	   copy	   is	   made	   by	  starting	  up	   the	  machine	  and	   the	  machine	  has	  an	  authorized	   (rather	   than	   specifically	  owned)	  copy	  installed.	  	  23. 	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  101.	  24. 	  Id.	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Today,	   however,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   find,	   send,	   sell	   and	   share	   copies	   of	  works	  quickly,	  many	  times	  over,	  almost	  anywhere	  in	  the	  world	  by	  using	  a	  computer	   connected	   to	   the	   Internet.	   	   The	   question	   of	   modern	   copy	  ownership	   has	   therefore	   become	   a	   ground	   for	   major	   controversy.	   	   As	  copyright	   owners,	   and	   more	   specifically,	   software	   publishers,	   continue	  the	  fight	  to	  maintain	  control	  over	  their	  digital	  creations,	  they	  have	  begun	  resorting	   to	   digital	   licensing	   agreements.	   	   These	   contracts	   prevent	  purchasers	  of	  copies	  from	  legally	  owning	  them.	  	  A	  software	  licensee	  who	  possesses	  a	  copy	  is	  contractually	  restricted	  in	  his	  or	  her	  ability	  to	  use	  his	  or	  her	  software.	  Without	  ownership,	  the	  first	  sale	  doctrine	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  licensees	  and	  thus,	  both	  retailers	  and	  consumers	  are	  restricted	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  use,	  sell	  or	  give	  away	  the	  programs	  they	  have	  purchased.	  II.	  	  EXPANDING	  RESTRICTIONS,	  CONTRACTING	  USER	  RIGHTS	  
A.	  	  Combining	  Copyright	  and	  Contract	  Law	  Software	   is	   unique	   from	   other	  media	   that	   falls	   under	   copyright	   law	  because	   the	   use	   of	   software	   requires	   that	   the	   user	   create	   a	   copy	   in	   the	  computer’s	   random	   access	  memory	   (RAM)	   in	   order	   for	   the	   software	   to	  function.25	   	   While	   the	   temporary	   copy	   is	   erased	   when	   the	   program	   is	  closed,	   without	   the	   creation	   of	   such	   a	   copy,	   the	   user’s	   software	   is	  functionally	   nothing	   more	   than	   inaccessible	   lines	   of	   code.26	   	   This	  temporary	  copy	  of	  software	  into	  RAM,	  therefore,	  pulls	  users	  in	  under	  the	  Copyright	  Act	   and	   restricts	   certain	   permissible	   acts	   of	   copying	   to	   those	  who	  qualify	  as	  copy	  owners.27	  The	  problem	  with	  such	  a	  policy	  is	  that	  most	  software	  that	  individuals	  purchase	   and	   use	   today	   is	   not	   actually	   sold	   to	   them	   but	   specifically	  licensed	   by	   the	   software’s	   owners.28	   	   The	   establishment	   of	   a	   licensing	  agreement	   between	   users	   and	   creators	   means	   that	   users	   are	  contractually	   bound	   to	   utilize	   the	   software	  within	   the	   specific	   terms	   of	  their	  agreement.	  	  This	  also	  means	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  users	  are	  not	  copy	  owners	  and	  are	  no	  longer	  protected	  by	  the	  Copyright	  Act,	  which	  not	  only	   gives	   exclusive	   first	   sale	   protection	   but	   also	   “essential	   step”	  protection	   to	   owners.29	   	   The	   essential	   step	   doctrine	   gives	   copy	   owners	  the	  ability	  to	  create	  copies	  in	  a	  computer’s	  RAM	  when	  such	  copying	  is	  “an	  
 25. 	  Justin	  Van	  Etten,	  Copyright	  Enforcement	  of	  Non-­‐Copyright	  Terms:	  Mdy	  v.	  Blizzard	  and	  
Krause	  v.	  Titleserv,	  2011	  DUKE	  L.	  &	  TECH.	  REV.	  7,	  137,	  139.	  	  26. 	  Id.	  27. 	  Id.	  28. 	  See	  id.	  at	  150.	  29. 	  See	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  117.	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essential	  step	  in	  the	  utilization	  of	  the	  computer	  program.”30	  	  Such	  copies	  are	  made	  every	   time	  a	  user	   installs	   or	   runs	   a	   program	  and	   courts	  have	  held	   that	   the	   copies	  made	   in	  RAM	   are	   in	   fact	   copies	   that	   fall	   under	   the	  Copyright	   Act.31	   	   Theoretically,	   a	   licensed	   software	   user	   who	   does	   not	  own	   a	   copy	   under	   the	   terms	   of	   a	   license	   could	   be	   charged	   for	  infringement	  under	  the	  Act	  because	  a	  copy	  is	  created	  when	  the	  program	  is	  used.	   	  Obviously,	   it	  would	  not	  make	   sense	   for	   software	   companies	   to	  attack	  their	  consumer	  base	  for	  everyday	  use.	  	  However,	  if	  a	  user	  violates	  the	  often	  strict	  boundaries	  set	  out	   in	  a	   license	  agreement,	   the	  copyright	  holder	  has	  both	  copyright	  and	  contract	  law	  at	  its	  disposal	  and	  can	  exploit	  the	  unique	  legal	  recourse	  offered	  by	  each.	  	  	  
B.	  	  Expanding	  Control	  at	  the	  Expense	  of	  Individual	  Use	  There	  are	   two	  main	  problems	  that	  arise	   from	  license	  holders’	  use	  of	  licensing	   rather	   than	   exclusively	   relying	   on	   the	   copyright	   law.	   	   First,	  licensors	   make	   license	   agreements	   that	   extend	   far	   beyond	   the	   general	  bounds	   of	   copyright	   law,	   such	   that	   licensees	   can	  be	  held	   in	   violation	   of	  usage	   agreements	   if	   they	   install	   software	   on	   non-­‐authorized	   hardware,	  break	   the	   rules	   in	   an	   online	   game,	   or	   refuse	   to	   give	   honest	   personal	  information	  when	   registering.	   32	   	   Second,	   software	   creators	  use	   licenses	  to	  restrict	  activities	  normally	  permitted	  under	  the	  Copyright	  Act,	  such	  as	  prohibiting	   reverse	   engineering,	   sales	   or	   personal	   modification	   of	  software.33	   	   In	   an	   effort	   to	   protect	   private	   business	   interests,	   software	  owners	  maneuver	  in	  between	  copyright	  law	  and	  contract	  law,	  taking	  the	  most	  desirable	  portions	  of	  each	  while	  circumventing	  the	  areas	  that	  may	  threaten	  their	  business	  interests	  by	  permitting	  specific,	  undesirable	  user	  acts.	   	  These	  two	  uses	  of	  licenses	  have	  become	  problematic	  because	  such	  contractual	  breaches	  potentially	  fall	  under	  copyright	  infringement,	  due	  to	  the	   functional	   need	   to	   copy	   the	   software	   into	   RAM,	   even	   though	   the	  contractual	  provisions	  are	  not	  specifically	  guarded	  by	  copyright	  law.	  By	   tying	   licensing	   violations	   to	   copyright	   infringement,	   software	  copyright	  holders	  gain	  three	  distinct	  benefits,	  all	  of	  which	  encourage	  the	  expansion	   of	   such	   restrictive	   practices	   and	   increasingly	   threaten	   future	  individual	   software	   usage.34	   	   First,	   copyright	   damages	   are	   often	   greater	  than	   those	   allowed	  by	   contract	   law,	  which	   are	   “generally	   limited	   to	   the	  
 30. 	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  117(a)(1).	  31. 	  MAI	  Sys.	  Corp.	  v.	  Peak	  Computer,	  Inc.,	  991	  F.2d	  511	  at	  518	  (9th	  Cir.	  1993).	  32. 	  Van	  Etten,	  supra	  note	  25,	  at	  141.	  33. 	  Id.	  34. 	  Id.	  at	  140.	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value	  of	  the	  actual	  loss	  caused	  by	  the	  breach.”35	  	  In	  software	  infringement	  cases,	  actual	  losses	  are	  often	  quite	  low.	  	  This	  stands	  in	  stark	  contrast	  with	  copyright	  infringement	  damages,	  which	  can	  include	  statutory	  damages	  of	  up	   to	   $150,000	   for	  willful	   infringement,	   regardless	  of	   actual	   damages.36	  	  Second,	   copyright	   claims	   extend	   farther	   than	   contractual	   claims,	   which	  only	  bind	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  contract.	  	  Copyright	  claims,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  reach	   to	   any	   and	   all	   who	   violate	   the	   holder’s	   copyright.37	   	   Lastly,	  copyright	   law	   provides	   for	   many	   more	   remedies	   than	   contract	   law.	  	  Contract	  law	  is	  basically	  limited	  to	  actual	  damages	  and,	  in	  some	  cases,	  to	  specific	  performance	  such	  as	  the	  return	  of	  the	  software	  to	  the	  copyright	  holder.38	   	  However,	  copyright	  law	  allows	  for	  “injunctive	  relief,	  seizure	  of	  infringing	   articles,	   and	   awards	   of	   costs	   and	   attorneys’	   fees,”	   39	   giving	  content	  owners	  effective	  means	  to	  deter	  and	  stop	  breaching	  actors.40	  Ultimately,	  these	  benefits	  entice	  software	  copyright	  holders	  to	  invest	  a	   good	   deal	   of	   time	   and	   energy	   into	   seeking	   the	   protections	   of	   both	  contract	  and	  copyright	   law	  whenever	  possible,	  as	  well	  as	  pursuing	  both	  vehemently	  in	  a	  court	  of	  law.	  Through	  clever	  manipulation	  of	  contract	  and	  copyright	  law,	  software	  creators	  have	  broadly	  expanded	  their	  stronghold	  on	  the	  individual	  user’s	  ability	   to	   use	   the	   software	   in	   ways	   other	   than	   those	   prescribed	   by	   the	  creator.	  	  They	  have	  been	  able	  to	  skirt	  the	  protections	  offered	  to	  users	  by	  copyright	  law	  through	  licensing,	  while	  also	  legally	  insulating	  themselves	  by	  drawing	  licensed	  users	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  infringement	  through	  license	  violations.	   	   Such	   use	   of	   both	   licensing	   and	   copyright	   law	   to	  maintain	   a	  large	   amount	   of	   control	   over	   software	   is	   exemplified	   in	   the	   important	  Ninth	  Circuit	  decision	  of	  Vernor	  v.	  Autodesk	  Inc.	  III.	  	  THE	  VERNOR	  DILEMMA:	  LICENSING	  TO	  OVERRIDE	  FIRST	  SALE	  
A.	  	  Autodesk’s	  Licensing	  Practices	  The	   case	   of	   Vernor	   v.	   Autodesk,	   Inc.	   is	   one	   that	   demonstrates	   how	  software	   copyright	  holders	  will	   use	   a	   combination	  of	   both	   contract	   and	  copyright	   law	   to	   protect	   their	   business	   interests.41	   	   Autodesk,	  Incorporated	   is	  a	  computer	  software	  company	   that	  produces	  computer-­‐
 35. 	  MDY	  Indus.,	  LLC	  v.	  Blizzard	  Entm't,	  Inc.,	  629	  F.3d	  928,	  941	  n.3	  (9th	  Cir.	  2010).	  	  	  36. 	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  504(c)	  (2006).	  37. 	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  501(a).	  38. 	  Van	  Etten,	  supra	  note	  25,	  at	  140.	  39. 	  Id.	  at	  141.	  40. 	  MDY	  Indus.,	  LLC,	  629	  F.3d	  at	  941	  n.3.	  41. 	  Vernor	  v.	  Autodesk,	  621	  F.3d	  1102	  (9th	  Cir.	  2010),	  cert.	  denied,	  132	  S.	  Ct.	  105	  (U.S.	  2011).	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aided	   design	   software	   utilized	   by	   architects,	   engineers	   and	  manufacturers.42	   	  The	   software	  at	   issue	   in	   this	   case	   is	   called	   “AutoCAD”	  and	  Autodesk	  holds	  registered	  copyrights	  in	  all	  versions	  of	  the	  product.43	  	  Since	   1986,	   the	   AutoCAD	   software	   has	   been	   offered	   to	   customers	  pursuant	   to	   a	   strict	   software	   licensing	   agreement	   (SLA)	   that	   must	   be	  accepted	  in	  order	  to	  use	  the	  software.44	  The	   specific	   version	  of	  AutoCAD	  at	   issue,	   known	  as	  Release	  14,	  was	  sold	   to	   customers	   on	   a	   CD-­‐ROM	   and	   accompanied	   by	   a	   detailed	   SLA.45	  	  The	  SLA,	  which	   required	  user	   agreement	  before	   installing	   the	   software,	  (1)	   declared	   Autodesk	   the	   exclusive	   title	   holder	   of	   the	   software;	   (2)	  specified	   the	   user	   as	   licensee	   in	   possession	   of	   a	   nonexclusive	   and	  nontransferable	   license;	   (3)	   imposed	   transfer	   restrictions,	   including	   a	  requirement	   that	   the	   software	   is	   not	   to	   be	   rented	   or	   leased	   without	  Autodesk’s	   consent	   or	   transferred	   out	   of	   the	  Western	   Hemisphere;	   (4)	  imposed	   major	   use	   restrictions	   prohibiting	   acts	   such	   as	   modification,	  translation,	  or	  reverse	  engineering;	  (5)	  provided	  for	   license	  termination	  if	  a	  user	   failed	   to	  comply	  with	   the	  SLA	  restrictions;	  and	  (6)	  ordered	   the	  user	  to	  destroy	  any	  previous	  copies	  of	  the	  software	  after	  upgrading	  to	  a	  new	   version.46	   	   Customers	   not	   in	   agreement	  with	   any	   terms	   of	   the	   SLA	  were	  allowed	  to	  return	  the	  software	  for	  a	  refund.47	  Autodesk	   also	   took	   measures	   to	   enforce	   the	   SLA,	   assigning	   users	  designated	  serial	  numbers	  and	  accompanying	  “activation	  codes”	  in	  order	  to	  buy	  and	  use	  AutoCAD.48	   	  The	  issue	  in	  this	  case	  arose	  from	  the	  actions	  of	   Autodesk’s	   customer,	   Carwell/Thomas	   and	   Associates	   (CTA).	   	   CTA	  violated	  Autodesk’s	  SLA	  after	  upgrading	  from	  Release	  14.49	   	  Rather	  than	  destroying	   the	   copies	   as	   was	   required	   by	   the	   SLA,	   CTA	   sold	   four	   used	  software	   CD-­‐ROMs	   to	   eBay	   seller	   Timothy	   S.	   Vernor.	   	   In	   March	   1999,	  Autodesk	   reached	   a	   settlement	   with	   CTA	   for	   the	   violation;	   however,	  Vernor	  had	  already	  put	  the	  copies	  up	  for	  sale	  online	  in	  his	  eBay	  store.50	  
B.	  	  Vernor	  at	  the	  District	  Court	  Vernor,	  who	  commonly	  sold	  software	  on	  eBay,	  was	  aware	  of	  the	  pre-­‐existing	   SLA,	   but	   more	   importantly,	   he	   never	   installed	   the	   software	   or	  
 42. 	  Id.	  at	  1104.	  43. 	  Id.	  44. 	  Id.	  	  	  45. 	  Id.	  at	  1103.	  46. 	  Id.	  	  47. 	  Id.	  at	  1104.	  	  48. 	  Id.	  	  49. 	  Id.	  at	  1105.	  	  50. 	  Id.	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agreed	   to	   Autodesk’s	   terms	   in	   any	   way.51	   	   When	   Autodesk	   discovered	  Vernor	   was	   selling	   copies	   of	   Autodesk	   Release	   14	   online	   without	   its	  permission,	   the	   company	   filed	   a	   Digital	   Millennium	   Copyright	   Act	  (DMCA)	  notice	  with	  eBay,	  demanding	  the	  auction	  be	  taken	  down	  at	  once	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  copyright	  infringement.52	  	  Vernor	  contested	  Autodesk’s	  claims	   to	   eBay	   and	   eventually	   filed	   a	   countersuit,	   citing	   the	   first	   sale	  doctrine	  as	  an	  applicable	  defense	  to	  copyright	  infringement.53	  The	   district	   court	   found	   that	   Vernor	   did	   not	   infringe	   Autodesk’s	  copyright,	   as	  he	   acquired	   the	   software	   through	  a	   transfer	  of	  possession	  rather	   than	   a	   license	   and	   consequently	   applied	   the	   first	   sale	   doctrine.54	  	  In	   making	   its	   decision,	   the	   district	   court	   cited	   the	   Ninth	   Circuit	   case	  
United	  States	  v.	  Wise,	  which	  demanded	  an	  analysis	  of	  all	  circumstances	  of	  a	   transaction	  when	  determining	   copyright	   infringement.55	   	   Just	   labeling	  AutoCAD	  with	   a	   license	  was	  not	   enough	   to	  bind	  Vernor;	   rather,	   he	  was	  not	   bound	   to	   pay	   recurring	   fees.56	   	   The	   court	   held	   that	   his	   singular	  payment	  to	  purchase	  the	  software	  was	   indicative	  of	  a	  sale	  rather	  than	  a	  license.57	  	  Autodesk	  appealed	  this	  decision	  to	  the	  Ninth	  Circuit.58	  
C.	  	  Vernor	  at	  the	  Circuit	  Court	  On	   appeal,	   the	   Ninth	   Circuit	   held	   that	   the	   district	   court	   applied	   the	  incorrect	   test.59	   	   The	   circuit	   court	   focused	   less	   on	   Vernor’s	   onetime	  payment	  and	  concentrated	  its	  discussion	  on	  the	  specificity	  of	  Autodesk’s	  licensing	   agreement.60	   	   By	   the	   terms	   of	   the	   SLA,	   not	   only	   was	   CTA	   a	  licensee,	  but	  so	  too	  was	  Vernor,	  and	  thus	  he	  was	  bound	  to	  a	  legal	  contract	  he	  never	   agreed	   to.61	   	  The	   licensing	   agreement	  had	  effectively	   removed	  Vernor	   from	  an	   application	   of	   the	   first	   sale	   doctrine;	   he	  was	   effectively	  infringing	  on	  Autodesk’s	  exclusive	  right	  to	  vend.62	   	  The	  court	  decided	  to	  stake	  out	  a	  new	  test	  based	  on	  the	  previous	  precedent	  laid	  out	  in	  Wise	  and	  three	   more	   modern	   software	   licensing	   cases,	   applying	   a	   brand	   new	  
 51. 	  Id.	  	  52. 	  Id.	  	  53. 	  Id.	  	  54. 	  Vernor	  v.	  Autodesk,	  Inc.,	  555	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  1164,	  1170–71	  (W.D.	  Wash.	  2008).	  	  55. 	  See	  United	  States	  v.	  Wise,	  550	  F.2d	  1180	  (9th	  Cir.	  1977).	  56. 	  Vernor,	  621	  F.3d	  at	  1106.	  57. 	  Id.	  58. 	  Id.	  59. 	  Id.	  at	  1116.	  60. 	  Id.	  at	  1111.	  	  61. 	  Id.	  62. 	  Id.	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standard	  to	  Vernor’s	  present	  dilemma.63	  
Wise	  mandated	  that	  a	  court	  shall	  look	  into	  “all	  of	  the	  provisions”	  of	  a	  contractual	  agreement	  when	  deciding	  whether	  a	  customer	  is	  a	  licensee	  or	  an	   owner	   of	   a	   copy.64	   	   On	   appeal,	   the	   Ninth	   Circuit	   reevaluated	   the	  method	  of	  balancing	  such	  provisions	  according	   to	  what	   is	  known	  as	   the	  “MAI	   trio”	   of	   cases:	   MAI	   Systems	   Corp.	   v.	   Peak	   Computer,	   Inc.,65	   Triad	  
Systems	   Corp.	   v.	   Southeastern	   Express	   Co.,66	   and	   Wall	   Data,	   Inc.	   v.	   Los	  
Angeles	   County	   Sheriff’s	   Department.67	   	   The	   court	   felt	   such	   an	  investigation	   appropriate	   because	   the	   lower	   court	   had	   found	  Wise	   and	  the	  MAI	  trio	  irreconcilable,	  and	  therefore	  felt	  it	  appropriate	  to	  follow	  the	  earlier	  Wise	  decision.68	  	  Disagreeing	  with	  the	  district	  court,	  the	  appellate	  court	  felt	  that	  a	  new	  test	  must	  be	  synthesized	  in	  order	  to	  reconcile	  prior	  precedents,	  as	  required	  under	  a	  previous	  case.69	  All	  three	  cases	  of	  the	  MAI	  trio	  dealt	  specifically	  with	  the	  essential	  step	  doctrine;	   however,	   the	   court	   found	   such	   a	   defense	   doctrine	   to	   be	  appropriately	   analogous	   to	   first	   sale	   because	   both	   doctrines	   rely	   on	   a	  consumer’s	  distinct	  ownership	  of	  a	  copy	   in	  order	   to	  successfully	  defend	  against	   an	   infringement	   action.70	   	   Software	   licensees	   are	   not	   afforded	  such	  statutory	  protection	  because,	  under	  the	  terms	  of	  licensing	  contracts,	  they	  do	  not	   technically	  own	  a	   copy.71	   	  Therefore,	   the	   court’s	   analysis	  of	  Vernor’s	  case	  again	  hinged	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  he	  was	  a	  software	  owner	  or	  simply	   a	   licensee.	   	   In	   attempting	   to	   reconcile	   the	   decisions	   of	  Wise	   and	  the	  MAI	  trio,	  the	  court	  read	  the	  combined	  decisions	  to	  prescribe	  a	  three-­‐part	   test	   to	  determine	   the	  status	  of	  a	  software	  user,	   taking	   into	  account	  the	  language	  and	  the	  intentions	  encompassing	  an	  EULA.72	  	  The	  test	  relied	  heavily	   on	   the	   terms	   set	   forth	   by	   the	   copyright	   holder.	   	   The	   court	   held	  that	  a	  user	  is	  a	  licensee	  rather	  than	  a	  copy	  owner	  when	  (1)	  the	  copyright	  holder	   specified	   that	   the	   software	   user	   was	   granted	   a	   license;	   (2)	   the	  copyright	  holder	  significantly	  restricted	  the	  user’s	  ability	  to	  transfer	  the	  software;	   and	   (3)	   the	   copyright	   holder	   imposed	   notable	   restrictions	   on	  
 63. 	  Id.	  64. 	  Id.	  at	  1109.	  65. 	  MAI	  Sys.	  Corp.	  v.	  Peak	  Computer,	  991	  F.2d	  511	  (9th	  Cir.	  1993).	  66. 	  Triad	  Sys.	  Corp.	  v.	  Se.	  Express	  Co.,	  64	  F.3d	  1330	  (9th	  Cir.	  1995).	  67. 	  Wall	  Data	   Inc.	  v.	  Los	  Angeles	  County	  Sheriff's	  Dept.,	  447	  F.3d	  769	  (9th	  Cir.	  2006);	  
Vernor,	  621	  F.3d	  at	  1108.	  68. 	  Vernor,	  621	  F.3d	  at	  1111.	  69. 	  Id.	  (citing	  Cisneros-­‐Perez	  v.	  Gonzales,	  451	  F.3d	  1053,	  1058	  (9th	  Cir.	  2006)).	  70. 	  See	  id.	  at	  1109.	  	  	  71. 	  See	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  117(a)(1)	  (2006).	  72. 	  Vernor,	  621	  F.3d	  at	  1110–11.	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the	  user.73	  The	   court	   also	   noted	   that	   Congress	   indeed	   took	   steps	   to	   allow	  computer	   owners	   to	   copy	   software	   for	  maintenance	  or	   repair	   purposes	  under	   17	  U.S.C.	   §	   117(c);	   however,	   the	   court	   pointed	   out	   that	   Congress	  declined	   to	  overturn	   the	  MAI’s	  holding	   that	   licensees	  did	  not	  qualify	   for	  the	  essential	  step	  defense.74	  Applying	  the	  newly	  created	  test	  to	  Vernor’s	  case,	  the	  court	  examined	  the	   contractual	   relationship	   between	   Autodesk	   and	   CTA.75	   	   Looking	   to	  Autodesk’s	  EULA,	  the	  court	  found	  the	  first	   factor,	  whether	  the	  copyright	  holder	   specifically	   granted	  users	   a	   license,	   in	   fact	   favored	   the	   copyright	  holder.76	   	   Autodesk’s	   agreement	   specified	   that	   it	   retained	   title	   to	   the	  software;	  the	  purchaser	  was	  only	  granted	  a	  license	  to	  use	  the	  software.77	  	  Applying	   the	   second	   factor	   and	   examining	   the	   extent	   of	   transfer	  restrictions	   placed	   on	   users,	   the	   court	   found	   that	   CTA	  was	   significantly	  restricted	  from	  transferring	  the	  software,	  including	  a	  prohibition	  on	  any	  transfers	   out	   of	   the	  Western	  Hemisphere.78	   	   Lastly,	   the	   court	   examined	  the	  use	   restrictions	   that	  Autodesk	   imposed	  on	  CTA	  when	  granting	   their	  software	   license.79	   	  The	   court	   concluded	   that	  Autodesk’s	   restrictions	  on	  uses	   such	  as	  modifying,	   translating	  or	   reverse	  engineering	   the	   software	  were	  significant	  enough	   to	   favor	   the	  copyright	  holder.80	   	  Ultimately,	   the	  court	   held	   that	   such	   specificity	   and	   restrictions	   in	   Autodesk’s	   EULA	  indicated	  that	  CTA	  was	  a	  licensee	  and	  did	  not	  own	  a	  copy	  of	  Release	  14.81	  Therefore,	  because	  CTA	  did	  not	  own	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  AutoCAD	  software	  and	   the	   EULA	   specified	   that	   Autodesk	   reserved	   title	   to	   the	   software	  copies	   and	   imposed	   restrictions	   on	   transfer	   and	   usage	   of	   the	   software,	  Autodesk’s	   licensing	   agreement	   applied	   not	   only	   to	   CTA,	   but	   also	   to	  customers	   such	   as	   Vernor,	   who	   had	   not	   agreed	   to	   the	   licensing	  agreement.82	   	   Because	   CTA	   violated	   its	   licensing	   agreement	   with	  Autodesk,	   the	   sale	   to	   Vernor	   and	   his	   consequent	   sale	   to	   third	   party	  customers	  was	  invalid.83	  	  Neither	  Vernor	  nor	  his	  customers	  were	  owners	  of	  the	  software	  and	  therefore	  could	  not	  rightfully	  sell	  their	  copies,	  as	  they	  
 73. 	  Id.	  at	  1111.	  74. 	  Id.	  75. 	  Id.	  at	  1111–12.	  76. 	  Id.	  at	  1111.	  77. 	  Id.	  	  78. 	  Id.	  	  79. 	  Id.	  at	  1112.	  80. 	  Id.	  at	  1111–12.	  81. 	  Id.	  at	  1112.	  82. 	  Id.	  	  83. 	  Id.	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were	   not	   protected	   by	   the	   first	   sale	   doctrine.84	   	   Vernor	   was	   liable	   for	  copyright	  infringement	  because	  he	  violated	  Autodesk’s	  exclusive	  right	  to	  vend.85	  IV.	  	  THE	  BIGGER	  ISSUE:	  CONSUMER	  USE	  AND	  THE	  VALUE	  OF	  THE	  AUTHOR’S	  INTEREST	  Knowing	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  Vernor	  case	  and	  understanding	  the	  outcome,	  new	  questions	  about	  copyright	  and	  its	  role	  in	  today’s	  increasingly	  digital	  world	   appear:	   	   What	   is	   the	   real	   purpose	   of	   copyright?	   	   How	   has	   it	  changed?	  	  Is	  this	  good?	  	  Where	  should	  it	  go?	  From	  a	  contractual	  standpoint,	  Vernor	  is	  not	  nearly	  as	  problematic	  as	  the	  implications	  it	  causes	  in	  copyright	  law.	  	  Simply	  put,	  just	  like	  selling	  a	  leased	  car	  bought	  from	  an	  acquaintance	  instead	  of	  properly	  returning	  the	  vehicle	  as	  per	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  lease	  agreement,	  there	  existed	  an	  obvious	  contractual	  violation	  in	  the	  case.	  	  CTA	  allowed	  copies	  to	  be	  sold	  to	  Vernor	  even	   though	   it	   explicitly	   agreed	   to	   return	   or	   destroy	   the	   copies	   upon	  upgrading.	   	   By	   selling	   the	   software	   instead,	   the	   company	   clearly	   acted	  against	  the	  terms	  of	  its	  software	  agreement,	  and	  hence	  violated	  its	  end	  of	  the	  contractual	  obligation.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  such	  a	  contractual	  violation	  ties	  a	   seller	   to	   copyright,	   though,	   seems	   to	   broadly	   expand	   the	   power	   of	  copyright	   holders	   to	   prosecute	   those	   who	   violate	   their	   SLAs.	   	   Due	   to	  CTA’s	   violation,	   Vernor’s	   sales	   fell	   under	   a	   violation	   of	   copyright	   law,	  even	  though	  he	  was	  not	  contractually	  obligated	  to	  Autodesk	  in	  any	  way.	  Understanding	   both	   the	   contract	   and	   the	   copyright	   aspects	   of	   the	  case,	   Vernor	   is	   important	   because	   it	   points	   to	   a	   much	   larger	   problem	  approaching	  on	  the	  horizon	  of	  copyright	  law:	  important	  characteristics	  of	  copyright	   law	   are	   becoming	   increasingly	   defined	   by	   the	   Ninth	   Circuit’s	  copyright	  decisions.	   	   These	  decisions,	   however,	   are	  being	  based	  heavily	  upon	  contract	  law	  in	  the	  form	  of	  lease	  agreements	  rather	  than	  copy	  sales.	  	  The	   companies	   bringing	   these	   issues	   to	   the	   court	   are	   protecting	  themselves	   from	   important	   copyright	   defenses	   by	   contracting	   with	  customers	  while	   still	  maintaining	   the	  benefits	  offered	  by	   the	   copyrights	  that	   they	   hold.	   	   Software	   copyright	   owners	   have	   been	   increasingly	  favored	   in	   the	   court	   system,	   without	   very	   much	   legislation	   to	   argue	  otherwise.	   	  The	  ongoing	  trend	  in	  copyright	   law	  seems	  to	  point	  to	  a	  new	  regime	  that	  emphasizes	  authors’	  rights	  over	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  public	  benefit	  created	  through	  promoting	  ongoing	  creative	  expression.	  Therefore,	  the	  situation	  at	  hand	  now	  begs	  the	  question:	  Where	  do	  our	  
 84. 	  Id.	  	  85. 	  Id.	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copyright	  values	   truly	   lie?	   	  The	  growing	   trend	   in	   judicial	   interpretation,	  as	   exemplified	   by	   Vernor,	   is	   that	   licensing	   agreements,	   an	   almost	  universal	  practice	  in	  software	  sales,	  have	  effectively	  shut	  the	  door	  on	  the	  first	   sale	   doctrine	   applying	   to	   the	   software	   industry.	   	   Many	  establishments,	   including	   libraries,	   rental	   stores,	   used	   product	   retailers	  and	   a	   consumer	   rights	   group	   called	   the	   Electronic	   Frontier	   Foundation	  oppose	  such	  imposing	  policies	  as	  being	  both	  chilling	  to	  the	  industry	  and	  ultimately	   detrimental	   to	   the	   end	   goal	   of	   promoting	   the	   progress	   of	  public	  knowledge.86	  The	  main	  argument	  is	  really	  a	  weighing	  of	  the	  American	  value	  of	  the	  rights	   endowed	   to	   retailers	   and	   individuals	   based	   on	   copyright	  ownership	   and	   the	   ability	   of	   copyright	   holders	   to	   restrict	   digital	  customers’	  rights	  post-­‐sale.	   	  The	  potential	  exists	  that	  copy	  ownership,	  at	  least	   in	   the	   digital	   domain,	   will	   fall	   by	   the	   wayside	   altogether,	   causing	  consumers	   to	   lose	   important	   user	   protections	   previously	   guaranteed	  under	   copyright	   law.	   	   The	   result	   is	   that	   digital	   copies	   can	   no	   longer	   be	  owned	  by	  consumers	  at	  all,	  but	  only	   licensed	  and	  used,	  and	  contrary	   to	  the	   underlying	   intentions	   of	   copyright	   law,	   consumers	  may	   suffer.	   	  We	  must	  decide	  whether	  the	  potential	  detriments	  inflicted	  on	  consumers	  are	  outweighed	  by	  the	  benefits	  provided	  to	  producers.	  The	  United	  States	  Copyright	  Office’s	  mission	  statement	  declares,	  “The	  mission	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Office	  is	  to	  promote	  creativity	  by	  administering	  and	   sustaining	   an	   effective	   national	   copyright	   system.”87	   	   This	   is	   not	   a	  legally	   binding	   statement;	   however,	   it	   seems	   to	   clearly	   support	   the	  general	  notion	  that	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  copyright	  system	  is	  a	  means	  to	  the	  ultimate	  end	  of	  promoting	  creativity.	  	  Congress	  has	  given	  copyright	  owners	  important	  exclusive	  rights	  under	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  of	  1976,	  such	  as	  the	  exclusive	  rights	  to	  reproduce	  their	  work,	  create	  derivative	  works,	  distribute	   such	  works	  publicly,	   display	  or	  perform	   such	  works	  publicly,	  and	  assign	  and	  license	  their	  works	  as	  they	  see	  fit.88	  	  However,	  these	  rights	  are,	   at	   least	   theoretically,	   the	  means	   to	   the	  end	  of	  promoting	   creativity.	  	  Therefore,	   we	   must	   decide	   whether	   copyright	   law	   really	   supports	  creativity	   or	   instead	   functions	   merely	   as	   another	   system	   of	   property	  rights.	  	  The	  answer	  to	  that	  question,	  in	  turn,	  will	  determine	  how	  we	  write	  the	   next	   chapter	   of	   United	   States	   copyright	   law.	   	   I	   will	   discuss	   two	  reasonable	  ways	  to	  approach	  the	  expanding	  nature	  of	  software	  licensing	  
 86. 	  Andrew	  L.	  Berrier,	  Vernor	  v.	  Autodesk,	   Inc.:	  The	  Last	  First	  Sale?,	  46	  WAKE	  FOREST	  L.	  REV.	  867,	  879–80	  (2011).	  87. 	  U.S.	   Copyright	   Office,	   A	   Brief	   Introduction	   and	   History,	  http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html	  (last	  visited	  Sept.	  15,	  2012).	  	  88. 	  Copyright	  Act	  of	  1976,	  Pub.	  L.	  No.	  94-­‐553,	  90	  Stat.	  2541	  (Oct.	  19,	  1976)	  (codified	  at	  various	  parts	  of	  17	  U.S.C.).	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that	  is	  effectively	  restricting	  users’	  rights	  to	  utilize	  their	  legally	  purchased	  products	  as	  they	  see	  fit.	  V.	  	  TWO	  METHODS	  OF	  DEALING	  WITH	  THE	  EXPANSION	  OF	  STRICT	  LICENSING	  PRACTICES	  
A.	  	  The	  Wait	  and	  See	  Approach	  The	   first	   method	   that	   I	   propose	   for	   dealing	   with	   the	   expansion	   of	  strict	  licensing	  practices	  is	  to	  avoid	  hasty	  and	  potentially	  sloppy	  creation	  of	  statutory	  law	  and	  to	  allow	  the	  other	  circuit	  courts	  to	  continue	  refining	  the	   interpretation	   of	   what	   constitutes	   a	   license	   and	   what	   is	   actually	   a	  sale.	   	   Now	   that	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   has	   denied	   Vernor	   certiorari,	   it	  appears	  that,	  at	  least	  for	  the	  time	  being,	  the	  Justices	  of	  the	  highest	  court	  also	  support	   this	  approach.89	   	  The	  area	  of	  copyright	   licensing,	  especially	  in	   terms	   of	   software	   sales,	   is	   a	   complex	   field	   and	   it	   may	   benefit	   both	  copyright	  holders	  and	  consumers	  to	  allow	  the	  law	  to	  evolve	  more	  slowly,	  on	  a	  case	  by	  case	  basis,	  in	  order	  to	  appropriately	  protect	  from	  abuses	  on	  both	   sides.	   	   If	   consumers	  have	   too	  much	  power	   to	   transfer,	  modify	   and	  even	  profit	  from	  copyright	  holders’	  software,	  then	  the	  creators	  will	  likely	  lose	  profit	  as	  well	  as	  their	  incentive	  to	  create	  new,	  innovative	  and	  useful	  software.	   Ultimately,	   the	   public	   could	   be	   deprived	   of	   potentially	  important	   works.	   	   Also,	   some	   software	   producers	   may	   desire	   to	   sell	  strictly	  licensed	  software	  in	  order	  to	  insure	  quality	  and	  reliability	  in	  their	  products.	  	  While	  customers	  may	  be	  somewhat	  restricted	  in	  their	  use,	  they	  are	   also	   guaranteed	   to	   experience	   software	   smoothly	   as	   the	   creators	  intended.	   	   Finally,	   allowing	   companies	   to	   license	   their	   products	   to	  consumers	  as	   they	  see	   fit	   respects	  both	  parties’	   right	   to	  contract.	   	   If	   the	  courts	   restrict	   software	   producers’	   ability	   to	   freely	   enter	   into	   licensing	  agreements	   with	   customers,	   they	   will	   simply	   be	   diluting	   the	   area	   of	  contract	   law	   for	   the	   sake	  of	   copyright	   law,	  and	  ultimately	  promulgating	  yet	  another	  problem.	  
B.	  	  Expand	  the	  Doctrine	  of	  Copyright	  Misuse	  The	   second	   viable	   method	   for	   reigning	   in	   the	   restrictive	   licensing	  practices	  and	  consequent	  legal	  action	  that	  Vernor	  seems	  to	  promote	  is	  an	  expansion	   of	   an	   old	   equitable	   defense	   known	   as	   “copyright	   misuse.”90	  	  Copyright	   misuse	   was	   born	   as	   an	   extension	   of	   the	   doctrine	   of	   patent	  
 89. 	  Vernor	  v.	  Autodesk,	  621	  F.3d	  1102	  (9th	  Cir.	  2010),	  cert.	  denied,	  132	  S.	  Ct.	  105	  (U.S.	  2011).	  	  90. 	  G.	   Gervaise	   Davis	   III,	   The	   Affirmative	   Defense	   of	   Copyright	   Misuse	   and	   Efforts	   to	  
Establish	  Trademark	  Misuse,	  and	  Fraud	  on	  the	  Copyright	  Office,	  984	  PLI/Pat	  347	  (2009).	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misuse,	  which	  originally	   stemmed	   from	   the	  doctrine	  of	   “unclean	  hands”	  in	   the	  early	   twentieth	   century.91	   	   Formally	   established	   in	   the	  1990	  case	  
Lasercomb	  America,	   Inc.	   v.	   Reynolds,	   the	  doctrine	  was	  not	   only	   adopted,	  but	   also	   served	   as	   justification	   for	   denying	   the	   plaintiff	   relief	   for	  infringement.92	   	   As	   constructed	   in	   Lasercomb,	   copyright	   owners	   must	  have	   “clean	   hands”	   when	   pursuing	   infringement	   claims;	   if	   owners	   are	  found	  to	  be	  using	  copyrights	  to	  restrict	  users	  outside	  the	  public	  policy	  of	  rewarding	  authors	  for	  creating	  works	  that	  ultimately	  benefit	  the	  public	  at	  large,	  copyright	  misuse	  is	  “an	  almost	  absolute	  defense.”93	  	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  industrial	   company	   Lasercomb	   discovered	   that	   Holiday	   Steel,	   to	   which	  Lasercomb	   licensed	   die-­‐cutting	   software,	   had	   not	   only	   copied	  Lasercomb’s	   software	   but	   also	   sold	   some	   copies	   branded	   with	   an	  independent	  label	  to	  third	  parties.94	  	  The	  court	  found	  that,	  while	  Holiday	  Steel	   did	   infringe	   on	   Lasercomb’s	   copyright,	   Lasercomb’s	   licensing	  agreement	   constituted	   copyright	   misuse	   by	   prohibiting	   licensees	   from	  implementing	   any	  of	   Lasercomb’s	   ideas	   into	   their	   own	   software	   for	   the	  term	  of	  ninety-­‐nine	  years.95	   	  Such	  a	  licensing	  agreement	  reached	  further	  than	   the	   bounds	   of	   copyright,	   violated	   public	   policy,	   and	   therefore	  constituted	  misuse.96	   	  Holiday	  Steel	  was	  not	  held	   liable	   for	   its	   infringing	  practices.	  According	   to	   Lasercomb	   then,	   an	   individual	   can	   argue	   copyright	  misuse	  whenever	   it	   appears	   that	   the	   copyright	   holder	   has	   violated	   the	  aforementioned	  public	  policies	  resting	  at	   the	  base	  of	  copyright	   law.97	   	   It	  was	   not	   necessary	   that	   a	   defendant	   show	   that	   the	   copyright	   holder’s	  activity	  violates	  antitrust	  laws,	  that	  the	  copyright	  holder’s	  misuse	  directly	  affects	   the	   defendant,	   or	   that	   there	   exists	   competition	   between	   the	  plaintiff	  and	  defendant.98	  Consequently,	   the	   Ninth	   Circuit	   followed	   the	   case	   and	   accepted	  copyright	  misuse	  as	  a	  defense	  to	  copyright	  infringement	  in	  the	  1998	  case	  
Practice	   Management	   v.	   American	   Medical	   Ass’n.99	   	   In	   Practice	  
Management,	   the	  Ninth	  Circuit	   court	  held	   that	  AMA’s	   licensing	  practice,	  which	   was	   contingent	   on	   Practice	  Management’s	   agreement	   to	   not	   use	  
 91. 	  See	  Motion	  Picture	  Patents	  Co.	  v.	  Universal	  Film	  Mfg.	  Co.,	  243	  U.S.	  502	  (1917).	  	  92. 	  See	  Lasercomb	  Am.,	  Inc.	  v.	  Reynolds,	  911	  F.2d	  970	  (4th	  Cir.	  1990).	  93. 	  Davis,	  supra	  note	  90,	  at	  352.	  94. 	  Lasercomb,	  911	  F.2d	  at	  971–72.	  95. 	  Id.	  at	  978.	  96. 	  Id.	  	  97. 	  Id.	  	  98. 	  Id.	  	  99. 	  Practice	  Mgmt.	  Info.	  Corp.	  v.	  Am.	  Med.	  Ass’n,	  121	  F.3d	  516,	  521	  (9th	  Cir.	  1998).	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any	  competitor’s	  code,	  constituted	  a	  misuse	  of	  its	  copyright.100	  	  The	  court	  reinforced	  Lasercomb	  and	  reiterated	  that	  antitrust	  violations	  were	  not	  a	  requisite	  factor	  to	  a	  finding	  of	  misuse.101	  Unfortunately	  for	  copyright	  misuse	  advocates,	  however,	  Congress	  has	  chosen	   to	   statutorily	   narrow	   its	   progenitor	   defense,	   patent	   misuse,	   to	  materially	  apply	  only	  to	  antitrust	  violations.102	  	  This	  need	  not	  be	  the	  case	  for	  applications	  of	  copyright	  law	  though,	  and	  it	  would	  be	  sensible	  for	  the	  courts	   to	   apply	   a	   less	   competition-­‐centric	   standard	   in	   copyright	  misuse	  doctrine	  than	  in	  patent	  misuse	  because	  copyright	  is,	  at	  least	  theoretically,	  focused	  primarily	  on	  creativity	  rather	  than	  competition.	  Therefore,	   understanding	   the	   groundwork	   for	   the	   copyright	  misuse	  defense,	  I	  propose	  that	  the	  other	  circuit	  courts	  become	  more	  receptive	  to	  claims	  of	  copyright	  misuse.	   	  This	  would	  be	  especially	  useful	   in	  software	  licensing	  cases	  such	  as	  Vernor,	  where	  a	  restrictive	  license	  can	  compound	  a	  contract	  violation	  and	  a	  copyright	  violation.	   	   Simply	  put,	   this	   is	  a	  plea	  for	  the	  courts	  to	  become	  more	  sensitive	  to	  the	  grounds	  of	  copyright	  law	  and	  to	  restrict	  copyright	   infringement	  actions	  that	  restrain	  the	  progress	  of	   human	   knowledge,	   including	   licensing	   practices	   that	   stifle	   the	  dissemination	  and	  use	  of	  digital	  media.	  CONCLUSION	  In	  conclusion,	   I	   feel	  that	   it	   is	   important	  to	  stay	  focused	  on	  the	  larger	  context.	  	  The	  world	  as	  we	  know	  it	  is	  now	  locked	  into	  a	  continuing	  reliance	  on	   digital	   media,	   especially	   digital	   software,	   for	   work,	   recreation,	  education	  and	  growth.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  expanding	  nature	  of	  this	  digital	  era,	  we	  will	  continue	  to	  develop	  as	  a	  global	  community.	  So	  too	  will	  we	  integrate	  software	   into	   our	   daily	   lives.	   	   Looking	   to	   the	   final	   ends	   of	   copyright,	   to	  promote	   the	   progress	   of	   human	   knowledge,	   it	   seems	   there	   are	   few	  greater	  threats	  to	  such	  a	  lofty	  goal	  than	  an	  expanding	  system	  of	  license-­‐based	   use	   restriction.	   	   By	   allowing	   copyright	   owners	   to	   bind	   users	   too	  strictly,	   both	   through	   contract	   and	   copyright	   law,	   it	   is	   possible	   that	  we	  are	  betraying	  the	  very	  progress	  that	  we	  claim	  to	  promote.	  However,	  if	  we	  also	  wish	  to	  promote	  the	  interests	  of	  those	  making	  our	  lives	  easier,	  more	  efficient	  and	   fun	   in	  an	   increasingly	  digital	   society,	  we	  must	   keep	   in	   mind	   that	   this	   area	   of	   law,	   like	   all	   areas	   of	   the	   law,	  constitutes	  an	  act	  of	  balance.	  	  Although	  it	  may	  appear	  easy	  to	  point	  to	  the	  anti-­‐competitive	   practices	   of	   a	   handful	   of	   software	   companies	   with	  malice,	   we	   must	   keep	   in	   mind	   that	   many	   of	   these	   companies	   are	   also	  
 100. 	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  101. 	  Id.	  at	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working	   hard	   to	   develop	   and	   publish	   creative	   and	   important	   software	  that	  can	  serve	  us	  in	  new	  and	  interesting	  ways.	  We	  must	  be	   focused	  on	   finding	   the	  balance.	   	  The	   importance	  of	   this	  discussion	   lies	   in	   finding	   ways	   to	   promote	   creativity	   and	   insulate	  copyright	   holders	   from	   losing	   hard-­‐earned	  money	   to	   the	  multitudes	   of	  potential	  infringers	  that	  exist	  on	  a	  worldwide	  scale.	  	  We	  must	  also	  be	  sure	  to	  promote	  creativity	  and	  knowledge,	  as	  the	  copyright	  clause	  instructs	  us	  to,	   by	   allowing	  users	   to	   access,	   utilize	   and	   learn	   from	   software	  without	  constant	   fear	   of	   infringement	   lawsuits.	   	   I	   feel	   that	   an	   expansion	   of	  copyright	  misuse	  law	  would	  afford	  us	  a	  way	  to	  strike	  a	  balance	  between	  individual	  use	  and	   creator	   control	   in	   such	  a	  way	   that	   copyright	  holders	  will	  be	  forced	  to	  self-­‐police	  their	   licensing	  agreements	  and	  be	  wary	  that	  unfair	  practices	  will	  not	  be	  tolerated.	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  Vernor	  court’s	  decision	  is	  not	  a	  reckless	  one.	  	  The	  Ninth	  Circuit	  has	   recognized	   that	   it	   is	  within	  Congress’s	   control	   to	  modify	   the	  Copyright	  Act	  and	  to	  define	  “copy	  owner”	   in	  a	  more	  preferable	  manner.	  	  Congress	  has	  not	  yet	  acted.	   	  If	  the	  courts	  do	  not	  help	  to	  strike	  a	  balance,	  then	  the	  cycle	  will	  continue.	  	  If	  we	  allow	  copyright	  holders	  to	  continue	  to	  license	  their	  software	  too	  easily,	  facilitating	  the	  restriction	  of	  users’	  rights	  to	   freely	  use	  a	  product	   in	   their	  own	  unique	  ways,	   then	  we	  may	  one	  day	  find	   ourselves	   so	   restricted	   by	   licenses	   that	   we	   no	   longer	   truly	   own	  anything	  digital	  at	  all.	  	  	   DONALD	  FRANK	  JANKOWSKI	  II*	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